The Economic and Financial Determinants of Carbon Prices by Carlo Carraro & Alice Favero
396                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
JEL Classification: C72, H23, Q25, Q28 
Keywords: CO2 emission allowances, Emissions Trading Scheme, EU ETS, CO2 price, carbon market 
The Economic and Financial Determinants 
of Carbon Prices 
Carlo CARRARO – (corresponding author: carlo.carraro@feem.it) 
Alice FAVERO         both: University of Venice and Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 
Abstract 
The aim of this paper is to analyze the economic and financial determinants of car- 
bon dioxide (CO2) prices from the short and long-term perspective, in particular within 
the EU-wide CO2 emissions trading system (EU ETS). After reviewing present carbon 
markets, this paper investigates the several drivers of carbon prices from both n financial 
and an economic perspective. It then examines the main impacts of these drivers in the short 
and long term. Finally, by comparing the results of several academic and financial stud-
ies, this paper identifies the average carbon price and its standard deviation for different 
future time horizons. 
1. Introduction 
Carbon emissions from energy production and industrial processes are deeply 
entrenched in the economy. Thus, in order to mitigate the risk of catastrophic climate 
change, they need to be reduced to a fraction of today’s level. In this context, the chal-
lenge for climate policy is to deliver these emissions reductions effectively and at 
low cost. Carbon prices play an essential role in this process by creating incentives 
for all players in the economy to reduce carbon emissions. Carbon pricing can con-
tribute to emissions reductions in two ways: (i) by shifting production towards low- 
-carbon and more energy-efficient technologies; and (ii) by substituting high-carbon 
input factors, products, and services with less carbon-intensive alternatives. 
Governments can introduce a price for carbon either by using a cap-and-trade 
scheme or by imposing a tax on carbon emissions or other forms of regulation. In 
cap-and-trade schemes, governments set a cap on the total volume of emissions of 
a given pollutant and allocate the corresponding volume of allowances. Such allow-
ances can then be freely traded. In particular, firms that would face high costs to 
reduce their emissions will buy allowances from firms with lower costs, thus re-
ducing the total costs of emissions reductions. Hence, within a cap-and-trade scheme, 
carbon prices are set by market forces, whereas in the case of a carbon tax, the na-
tional government decides the price of carbon at the national level. 
This paper analyzes the functioning of carbon markets and focuses in par-
ticular on the determinants of carbon prices in a cap-and-trade scheme. Section 2 
describes the origins of carbon markets and related policy decisions. Section 3 iden-
tifies the determinants of carbon prices, whereas section 4 uses existing climate 
economy models to provide an assessment of future short-term and long-term carbon 
prices. A concluding section summarizes our results. 
2. Carbon Markets 
Carbon markets originated from the Kyoto Protocol, which introduced three 
market-based mechanisms: the Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS),
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opment Mechanism (CDM)
2 and Joint Implementation (JI).
3.These mechanisms yield 
certified emission reductions (CERs) and emission reduction units (ERUs), allowing 
both allowances and credits to be traded in the market.  
In order to understand carbon markets, it is important to recognize the dif-
ferences between these types of carbon commodities and the  systems that create 
them. For instance, allowances are created by cap-and-trade systems, while carbon 
credits are created by baseline-and-credit systems such as JI and CDM. Baseline-and- 
-credit systems do not entail a finite supply of allowances, rather they allow for cred-
its generated by each new project implemented; such credits can then be used by 
buyers to comply with a regulatory emission target, to offset an emitting activity, or 
as voluntary measures.  
Carbon markets can be both regulated and voluntary; the latter can be defined 
as markets aimed at generating GHG emissions reductions not required by the Kyoto 
Protocol’s derived regulation. 
Currently, the most liquid markets are the European Union Emissions Trading 
Scheme (EU ETS) and the global Kyoto compliance market. The European Union 
adopted a CO2 market as the centerpiece of its own strategy for regulating emissions, 
thus creating the largest emissions market in the world so far. Hence, the European 
CO2 price is the global benchmark price. 
There is a multitude of other different cap-and-trade schemes being developed 
across Australia, New Zealand, some US states, and Canada. For instance, the Aus-
tralian Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme is scheduled to start operation in 2011;
4 
Japan is trialing a voluntary ETS after years of negotiation between government and 
powerful utilities and industry groups. The US is also making rapid progress; firstly, 
President Obama has clearly stated his support for a federal cap-and-trade scheme. In 
addition, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is up and running, while 
California and the Western Climate Initiative are working on state-level or regional 
plans. There is also a voluntary market rapidly taking shape and increasing in volume.  
Hence, even if the Kyoto Protocol failed to introduce a global emission trad-
ing system, separate market fragments with different price ranges have evolved in dif-
ferent countries. This implies that there is no single price for carbon across the world. 
The international carbon market is a system with different commodities, or types of 
carbon credits, that are linked to varying degrees. The emerging mosaic of carbon 
markets may look chaotic, but what we are observing is the emergence of a system of 
interlinked, policy-led, financial markets, similar to today’s currency markets.  
1 Emissions Trading – intended as a government-to-government market where sovereign states can buy or
sell credits they are issued with as part of their cap under the Kyoto Protocol, known as Assigned Amount 
Units (AAUs). 
2 Clean Development Mechanism – where tradable carbon credits are awarded to projects to reduce green-
house gas emissions that are hosted in developing countries and that complete a formal approval process. 
These credits are known as Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs). 
3 Joint Implementation – where the credits are awarded to similar projects, only they are hosted in de-
veloped countries or those with economies in transition. These credits are known as Emission Reduction
Units (ERUs). 
4 Australia’s centre-left government announced a one-year delay and major changes to its carbon trading
plans on May 4, citing the global economic recession for the need to set back the start date until July 2011 
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Table 1  Carbon Prices in Different Carbon Markets 
Name  Average price in 2008 
EUA – European emission allowances  13.52–29.38 €/tCO2 
8.00–13.00 €/tCO2 (no registred projects) 
CER – Certified emission reduction 
12.00–13.00 €/tCO2 (registred projects) 
ERU – Emission reduction units  14.00 €/tCO2  
RGGI allowances (RGAs)  3.41 $/short tCO2  
NGAC – New South Wales Greenhouse Gas 
Abetment Credits  3.75–8.05 A$/tCO2  
AEU – Australian emission unit (2011–2012)  19.00–23.00 A$/tCO2  
Voluntary credits (traded OTC)  2.50–12.20 $/tCO2  
CFI CCX – Chicago Climate Exchange  1.65 $/tCO2 
Notes: Voluntary credits values are volume weighted averages for 2007. Ecosystem Marketplace & New 
Carbon Finance, 2008. 
Source: Point Carbon (January 9, 2009): Carbon Market Monitor. 2008: Year in Review. 
 
The effect of these trading mechanisms is to introduce a price for carbon, 
placing a cost on emissions and a value on reductions. Additionally, even if devel-
oping countries have not capped their emissions, they participate in emissions trading 
via CDM. Indeed, under this mechanism, certified projects in developing countries 
yield credits from emissions reductions to developed countries that can be traded 
within their cap-and-trade schemes. Thus, the linkages created by emissions trading 
can introduce a price for carbon even in countries that have not capped their emis-
sions. Through the CDM mechanism, a global price has emerged which is paid for all 
emissions reductions, irrespective of the costs incurred for the emissions reduction, 
while adjustments to the price only reflect the project, country, and other risk com-
ponents.  
3. The Determinants of Carbon Prices 
Climate change is inherently a long-term, uncertainty-ridden challenge on 
the scientific, technological, and economic side. The fact that there will be ongoing 
new allocations and targets means that investors will only have a  short foresight   
into the  ETS when committing themselves to a  20–30 year investment (Reinaud, 
2007). This represents a risk that irreversible investment decisions will be based on 
pre-implementation expectations of climate change policy, and that the actual margin- 
al cost of abatement may differ from those expectations. Uncertainty may therefore 
lead to a delay in investment, thus impacting on the overall level of CO2 allowance 
prices. This is why it is fundamental for companies, investors, and traders to have a re-
liable pricing and evaluation model which allows efficient trading strategies, risk 
management, and investment decisions to be implemented in the carbon market. 
As previously discussed, many countries and regions already have a carbon 
trading scheme which sets a domestic carbon price. Hence, because countries and 
regions might pursue climate policies of different levels of ambition, cover different 
sectors, and use different allocation rules, different carbon prices may prevail in dif-
ferent carbon markets. In this context, Table 1 provides an overview of the different 
carbon prices currently prevailing in various markets.  
The main driving factors of CO2 allowance prices can be divided into two 
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directly concern the production of CO2 and thus demand and supply of CO2 allow-
ances.  
The first category has a long-term impact on prices. For instance, the EU ETS 
is created through political decisions and has to be framed in law, which must then  
be implemented through a series of regulatory and operating guidelines. This can 
potentially have an impact on the market price and its future developments. As a re-
sult, the market responds to occasional price signals from issues such as the number 
of European emission allowances (EUAs) issued, the EU “linking” Directive
5 which 
allows for the use of Kyoto credits in the scheme, as well as rules on banking EUAs 
from one trading phase to the next. It is a matter both of domestic policy directly 
connected with mitigation measures and of climate policies at the international level; 
for instance, what happens when the Kyoto Protocol’s first commitment period ends 
on December 31, 2012 will have a great influence on CO2 prices in the existing and 
proposed ETS. 
Uncertainty about future policy developments is indeed a major determinant 
of carbon prices. The Kyoto Protocol in its current form lasts only until 2012 and 
the outcome of the negotiations in Copenhagen in December 2009 is still very un-
certain. During the last Conference of the Parties (COP 14) in December 2008, many 
fundamental issues were debated that will affect the  future carbon market archi-
tecture, such as the  adoption of emissions targets for large developing countries, 
the inclusion of credits from avoided deforestation and carbon capture and seques-
tration, and the  potential commitment by the  US. The  uncertainty related to these 
matters induces high uncertainty in the future dynamics of carbon prices (see the next 
section for a quantitative analysis).  
On the domestic policy side, changes in policy directives or regulations may 
have substantial consequences on the actual demand and supply of permits and thus 
on the short-term price behavior of emission allowances. In the EU ETS, these could 
be decisions and announcements concerning the National Allocation Plans (NAPs) 
that set the  rules and reduction targets, allocation procedures, and limitations on 
the use for compliance of other credits. Generally, a cap-and-trade scheme such as 
the EU ETS defines a policy-driven market, because the demand for carbon abate-
ment is ultimately a function of the level at which policymakers set the cap and of 
the modalities for compliance that they allow. The balance between the overall cap 
and demand for these allowances by emitters covered by the scheme then determines 
the market price for allowances. If market participants set lenient caps, allowance 
prices are low. On the other hand, stringent caps push up prices so as to induce ad-
ditional measures to reduce emissions.  
A market event that shows such correlation occurred in April 2006, when 
the publication of verified emissions data for 2005 triggered a massive price drop. 
The total volume of allowances allocated to emitters exceeded emissions in the year, 
confirming early concerns of a lack of scarcity of allowances. The verified emissions 
data was leaked a few days before its official publication, which created profitable 
opportunities for some market participants with insider information. Consequently, 
surplus EUAs flooded the market and prices crashed 60% within one week from 
a high of around €30/tCO2 to €11/tCO2 (see Figure 1). Such a collapse is unlikely to 
5 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32004L0101:EN:HTML 400                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
 
occur in Phase 2 of the EU ETS (2008–2012), mainly because the caps set in the NAPs 
for this phase are more stringent than in the first one, and because of the banking 
provision. 
On the policy side, another decision that can play an important role in carbon 
price dynamics is the length of the trading period for which cap-and-trade schemes 
are implemented. For instance, a longer trading period will enhance price stability, 
especially considering that if the trading periods are too short and there is a scarcity 
of allowances in the system the price will be too sensitive to climatic conditions such 
as a cold winter or short-term economic cycles. With longer trading periods these 
impacts would be averaged out over more years and would thus have less impact. In 
addition, longer trading periods will mean more time for investors to respond to high 
allowance prices with investments in low or zero-carbon technologies, thus reducing 
emissions and eventually prices. The length of a trading period could be indirectly 
defined also through the provision of borrowing or banking. Because borrowing is 
generally not allowed, banking is a very important feature influencing the supply- 
-demand balance within one period. Indeed, with a bankability provision for an un-
limited period, in the case of excess supply in the market, entities are induced to save 
allowances and thus ensure continued scarcity and positive prices.  
During the first trading period, which was designed as an EU ETS pilot phase, 
banking of allowances was not allowed in order to protect the integrity of the second- 
-phase market from potential difficulties in the pilot phase, and to ensure that the vol-
ume of allowances in the second trading period was in accordance with the Kyoto 
target. By contrast, for Phase 2 and Phase 3, the bankability provision implies that 
any EUAs that are not used in Phase 2 can be carried over into Phase 3. This has very 
significant implications for the pricing of Phase 2 allowances, because expectations 
about a much tighter cap in Phase 3 make Phase 2 allowances more valuable.  
The demand for permits is affected by two other main determinants: economic 
growth and weather. For the first one, in a positive economic growth scenario, increas-
ing production levels imply an increase in emissions, which then implies a higher 
Figure 1  European Emission Allowances (EUAs) Price: 2005–2008
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demand for permits (and higher permit prices). On the other hand, weather is a criti-
cal key driver especially because power generation represents the majority of the total 
EUA allocation; as a consequence, factors that affect power generation are bound to 
affect the supply and demand of EUAs. A hot summer and a cold winter lead to 
an increase in energy demand and to corresponding higher emissions and price.  
On the supply side, some market factors play a key role in EUA price forma-
tion. For example, commodity prices (coal, oil, and gas) are crucial in determin- 
ing the relative attractiveness of different fuels for power generation, and hence 
the amount of  CO2 emitted. As for the  EU ETS, short-run abatement options are 
mainly based on fuel-switching to lower emitting fuels or energy efficiency meas-
ures. Fuel-switching options are strongly influenced by fuel prices, which therefore 
have a strong influence on the permit price. For instance, shifting from coal power 
stations to gas power stations would be required to deliver emissions reductions. At 
the same time, if natural gas prices increase, the carbon price at which it is econom-
ical to replace production of coal power stations by gas power stations also increases. 
Hence, market participants trade CO2 allowances at higher prices. As natural gas 
prices continue to rise, the carbon price required to switch would have to be even 
higher.  
On the other hand, a falling price of gas relative to coal reduces the theoretical 
coal-to-gas switching cost, implying a fall in the CO2 price. The differential between 
coal and gas prices is likely to remain an important factor also in the future, at least 
until carbon capture and sequestration (CCS)
6 becomes widely available. 
Finally, the external supply of CERs and ERUs is also an important factor af-
fecting carbon prices. Through the Linking Directive, the EU legislation allows con-
version of CERs into EUAs, even if for a limited amount. This limitation is set in order 
to ensure that countries not only buy project credits to meet their emissions targets, 
but also pursue policies to reduce their domestic emissions. Because the CDM mar-
ket is surrounded by large uncertainties over the future supply of credits and risk 
premiums related to the development of each project, CERs are in general cheaper 
than EUAs. Hence, linking is likely to have a downward effect on the EUA carbon 
price. Table 2 provides an overview of the carbon price determinants just described. 
4. Carbon Price Scenarios 
Risk managers and traders constantly hedge their positions against the  un-
certainty related to carbon prices: they are interested not only in the  long-term 
dynamics of emission allowance prices, but also in their short-term values. In this 
section, we therefore analyze several carbon price scenarios in both the short and 
long term, taking into account the aforementioned characteristics of CO2 allowances 
and the various determinants of carbon prices. 
6 The inclusion of CCS and a higher share of renewable energy in the energy mix will increase the abate-
ment potential and influence the permit demand and price too. On the other hand, carbon pricing is an im-
portant component of technology policy and can be sufficient to move innovation forward, playing, for
some sectors, a core role in improving innovation and diffusing more energy-efficient and lower-carbon 
technologies. Considering that CCS is more expensive than other conventional approaches it will only be 
commercially viable where conventional technologies, which produce carbon emissions, face higher costs
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Table 2  Carbon Price Determinants 
 Economic Financial 
Temperature (extreme)   
Discount rate  Relative fossil fuel price 
  Oil, coal and gas price 
Short term 
  Energy substitutability possibilities 
CDM and JI credits supply   
Uncertainty about the future regulations   
Economic growth   
Banking and borrowing of permits   
Overall allocation   
Long term 
  Costs of abatement efforts/technologies 
 
4.1 Short-Term Assessment 
As previously discussed, where a carbon trading framework has been clearly 
established – for example, within the EU ETS after the NAPs have been set – price 
formation is subject to market forces. Prices reflect uncertainties about technologies, 
demand, and availability of input factors.  
While price uncertainty is typical of many markets, carbon price uncertainty 
has some special features. Firstly, there are no natural lower bounds for carbon prices 
or expectations of reversion to the mean in the long term. This is in contrast to most 
commodities, where marginal production costs set natural price floors. Secondly, 
the  lack of a  long price history implies that it is impossible to extrapolate future 
prices on the basis of past experience, which is used in other markets to inform man-
agement and financing decisions. Finally, there are not yet any historical data on sup-
ply and demand balances, which were available for markets such as electricity and 
allowed for the approximation of historical performance (Neuhoff, 2008). Another 
important differ-ence between energy commodities and CO2 allowances is that there 
is no daily or hourly need for emission allowances, while industrial installations rely 
on a steady energy supply to operate. Thus, installations subject to the EU ETS only 
need to hold allowances matching their emission levels once a year (Uhrig-Homburg  
and Wagner, 2006).  
While the qualitative effect of most important factors influencing EUA prices 
is well known, the strength of their influence and their possibly time-varying cor-
relations still raise a lot of questions. At least aspects concerning the regulatory frame-
work – such as explicit trading rules (e.g., intertemporal trading), the linkage of 
the  EU ETS with the  market for project-based mechanisms, or other schemes in 
the future that may have an important impact on prices – cannot be incorporated into 
short-term models because they are the result of a long negotiation process. 
In a short-term model, EU ETS emissions reductions mostly result from 
the switch between coal and gas in power production. Therefore, the gas price and 
coal price have a significant impact on CO2 price uncertainty.
7 In particular, the level 
of fuel prices has a two-sided impact on carbon markets, as it simultaneously affects 
the  business-as-usual emission projections and the  availability and cost of fuel- 
-switching opportunities.  
7 According to IDEACarbon (2008) a 10% drop in the price of gas would trigger a fall in the EUA price of
about 9%.  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                             403 
Figure 2  EUA Price Forecast for Phases II and III  
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Source: Own calculation based on data from sources described in the Appendix. 
 
For our analysis, we considered several studies that propose short-term carbon 
price scenarios (see the Appendix), particularly for EUA prices, in order to obtain 
a reliable estimate of the price for the second (2008–2012) and third phase (2013– 
–2020) and assess the level of uncertainty in the short term through an estimate of 
the standard deviation.  
The questions usually asked in these studies are as follows. Will there be 
oversupply of permits/credits in the  market? Are there new potential players on 
the demand side, such as the aviation sector? Is the market long or short? Is the mar-
ket in a growing phase?
8 By answering these questions, a price scenario can be iden-
tified. By averaging all the price projections proposed in the publications produced 
by the organizations listed in Table 3 (in the Appendix), we obtain the results shown 
in Figure 2.  
It can be seen that the price dispersion is not too large and that the expected 
price in 2020 is about €45 per tonne of CO2. 
4.2 Long-Term Assessment 
In a similar way, we analyzed the output of several climate economy models 
to obtain a long-term price evaluation. Usually, a baseline scenario representing 
8 In recent months, many of the sources analyzed (namely, JP Morgan, Deutsche Bank, Société Générale, and
IDEACarbon) have changed their estimations because of the financial crisis, which has influenced the carbon 
market, causing much more uncertainty in it. In particular, the recessionary impact during the middle of 
phase 2 could reduce demand for permits plus the appetite to buy credits, which partly offsets the lower 
issuance; an immediate consequence of the slowdown will be a fall in EUA and CER demand. As Euro-
pean industry reduces its output, its carbon emissions will fall; the economy will also consume less energy, 
so emissions in the power sector will fall too. The effect is dampened by the fact that buildings are still 
being heated and the lights are still on, even if machines are running at less than full capacity. According
to IDEACarbon (2008) a (persistent) 10% fall in annual GDP growth – say from 2% to 1.8% – would 
reduce the system-wide shortfall (emissions-to-cap) by no more than 2.5%. This in turn would lead to
a 4.0–4.5% drop in EUA prices. Over this longer period, the effect of a slowdown today is much smaller. 
Average growth is reduced only to 1.95% per annum, fairly close to the long-term trend. The downward 
correction in the average EUA price we should therefore expect is no more than about 3.5% – or just under 
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a world in which there is no climate policy after 2012 is obtained from each model. 
Then, in order to achieve a cost-effective atmospheric stabilization of CO2 (or of all 
GHGs) the models require the inclusion of a carbon price through a cap-and-trade 
scheme or a carbon tax. Model-based analyses usually assume an idealized, flexible, 
comprehensive, least-cost approach to reducing emissions. Hence, stabilization costs 
are significantly lower than those obtained in the context of real-world policy, where 
countries set different levels of policy stringency, do not cover all sectors, do not in-
clude all GHGs, or employ more costly policy instruments.  
For example, limiting mitigation to CO2 (rather than focusing on all GHGs) 
could roughly double the CO2 prices needed to achieve a given stabilization goal 
(Newell and Hall, 2008). Another example is provided by Paltsev et al. (2009), who 
show how excluding emissions from some sectors, such as agriculture, services and 
households, thus forcing more reductions in the capped sectors, implies a CO2 price 
that is about 30% higher.  
Under different assumptions about growth, technological options, and sub-
stitutability, or fuel prices, different carbon prices can be obtained. The more strin-
gent the stabilization target, the higher the CO2 price required to achieve it, and vice 
versa.
9 The larger the set of countries which is assumed to be committed to emission 
reduction, the lower the carbon price. Each model experiment considers different pol-
icy measures to reach a stabilization target, which are indirectly drivers of the carbon 
price. As already mentioned, the reference scenario itself has a large influence on 
the carbon price produced when running the model. Despite these difficulties, we 
have compared the results of different model experiments in a meaningful way (see 
the Appendix). 
While the short-term evaluation of carbon prices focuses mostly on financial 
variables and fuel prices, the  long-term evaluation crucially depends on the  regu-
latory and policy framework, such as international policy for the post-Kyoto phase or 
the global effort to reduce emissions. Additionally, there is high uncertainty regard-
ing the fact that some countries might not yet be prepared to sign a deal at the re-
quired level of stringency, and even if all countries pursue climate policies at similar 
levels of stringency, they might prefer to give different emphasis to the role of carbon 
pricing in their domestic climate policy mix. Hence, during the initial years, we might 
observe carbon prices that differ across regions and, in this case, only in the long term 
would similar technologies and policies move carbon prices to similar levels across 
countries.  
In the model experiments considered in this paper, a global carbon price, or at 
least a unique price for countries signing an international agreement on emissions 
reductions, is assumed. Note that a global carbon market would achieve a lower car-
bon price than a fragmented or partial market, because of higher possibilities of equal-
izing abatement costs around the world. 
Another level of uncertainty in the model experiments is given by the share of 
low or zero carbon energy in the energy mix. In particular, the model projections 
9 Models suggest that the global carbon price level needed for stabilization at 450 ppm CO2 could be
3–14 times higher by 2050 than the price level needed to stabilize at 550 ppm, assuming emissions reduc-
tions are implemented cost-effectively. Likewise, a less stringent 650 ppm CO2 target could be achieved 
with CO2 prices that are 50–75 percent lower than the prices modeled for a 550 ppm target, since consider-
ably less action would be required relative to baseline expectations. See (Newell and Hall, 2008).  Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                             405 
Figure 3  CO2 Emissions Price: 450 ppm CO2 Stabilization 
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Source: Own calculation based on data from sources described in the Appendix. 
 
Figure 4  CO2 Emissions Price: 550 ppm CO2 Stabilization 
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Source: Own calculation based on data from sources described in the Appendix. 
 
include changes in both the  type and amount of fuels used in the  power sector; 
the stabilization scenarios usually show a trend toward lower overall energy use, 
reduced use of fossil fuels, and increased use of renewable electricity and biofuels, 
nuclear energy, and fossil-fuel-based electricity production with carbon capture and 
storage.
10 However, the shares of these technologies differ across the models, thus 
affecting the resulting carbon prices. 
All the model projections show CO2 prices rising gradually through the mid- 
-century. Longer time horizons imply a higher variance. In particular, Figure 3 and 
Figure 4 show the median of our results and the upper and lower levels for the 450 406                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
and 550 ppm stabilization scenarios. In the 450 ppm scenario, the average price is 
about €60 in 2030 and about €250 in 2050. The price is much lower in the 550 ppm sce-
nario. The variance, measured by the standard deviation, is much higher in the 450 ppm 
stabilization scenario than in the 550 ppm scenario.  
5. Conclusions 
Although there is not yet a global carbon market, but rather a fragmented 
market which generates different prices, we used a large set of model experiments to 
provide an assessment of future carbon prices. In such a context, assumptions about 
the future international climate policy, or about the future availability of carbon-free 
technologies, play a crucial role in determining the equilibrium CO2 price.  
Nonetheless, studies show some degree of convergence in their projections of 
future carbon prices, with uncertainty increasing with the length of the time horizon. 
Uncertainty also increases with the stringency of the long-term emission reduction 
target. For example, in the case of a more stringent goal, such as the 450 ppm stabi-
lization target, the uncertainty is higher than in a 550 ppm scenario. 
Higher uncertainty does not mean that the models analyzed in this paper are 
not reliable analytical tools. It rather underlines the crucial influence of a large set of 
key variables (economic, financial, political, etc.) which have to be taken into account 
in order to identify a consistent carbon-price scenario. The existing models can hardly 
account for all of them, and rather focus on a subset of them. Therefore, additional 
research effort would be necessary to produce better and more comprehensive cli-
mate economy models. 
 
APPENDIX 
A1. Overview of Commercial Studies Considered for the EUA Price Projections 
For carbon price projections in the short term (up to 2020), we analyzed esti-
mations published by consultancies and analysts listed in Table 3. With the intro-
duction of the European Trading Scheme, several market players, such as consultants 
specializing in support services to the carbon market or banks with carbon trading 
desks, buy and sell carbon permits for their clients (e.g., energy companies). In con-
trast with the global models presented below, which estimate a global carbon price, 
these projections tend to focus on a particular type of carbon credit: the European 
Emission Allowance (EUAs) for the second phase (2008–2012) and the third phase 
(2013–2020). 
In particular, the analyses contained in the studies mentioned in Table 3 con-
sider as the main factors for assessing the future evolution of EUA prices the supply 
of international offsets from CDM and JI, the availability of cheap domestic abatement 
measures, and the amount of banking of carbon assets from Phase II to Phase III, 
10 Other important aspects correlated to CO2 price uncertainty and considered in the models analyzed in 
this paper are:  
–  the introduction of new credits (i.e., REDD), 
–  the allocation of CO2 permits, 
–  limited or unlimited use of credits from flexible mechanisms, 
–  banking allowed or not allowed. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                             407 
Table 3  Overview of Commercial Studies Considered in the EUA Price Projections 
Company Year 
Fortis 2008 
JP Morgan   2008 
New Carbon Finance  2008 
Deutsche Bank   2008 
PointCarbon   2007 
Societe Generale   2008 
Daiwa   2009 
Idea carbon  2008 
 
Table 4  Overview of Studies Considered in the Long Term Carbon Price Analysis 
Author(s)  Model Name  Model type  Stabilization level 
(in CO2 only) 
Bosetti et al. (2009)  WITCH  Hybrid  450 
Paltsev et al. (2009)  EPPA  Top-down  450 and 550 
Tol (2009)  FUND  Top-down  450 and 550 
Blanford et al. (2008)  MERGE  Hybrid  450 and 550 
Elzen Den et al. (2009)  IMAGE/TIMER + FAIR Hybrid  450 Co2e 
Jacoby et al. (2008) EPPA Top-down  450 
Nordhaus (2008)  DICE  Top-down  450 and 550 
Babiker et al. (2008)  EPPA  Top-down  550 
Bernard et al. (2005)  GEMINI  Top down 




GMM Optimisation  model 
AIM Top-down 
Russ et al. (2006) 
GEM-E3 Top  down 
550 
IGSM Top-down 
MiniCam Hybrid  US CCSP (2006) 
Merge Hybrid 
450 and 550 
Bosetti et al. (2008)  WITCH  Hybrid  450 
 
which could encourage market players to buy the surplus of allowances in order to 
bank them for the following phase. 
A2. Overview of Studies Considered for Long-Term Projections of Carbon 
Prices 
The carbon price analyzed in section 4.2 is a global carbon price determined 
on a single global carbon market which equals the marginal abatement cost of the last 
abatement option in the least-cost abatement, thus assuming a perfect carbon market 
where no limits are set on the use of international offsets. This is a simplification of 
the real situation, in which a number of carbon markets are emerging, thus leading to 
a fragmented global carbon market.  
Most of the studies analyzed for the long-term carbon price scenario (Table 4) 
are based on top-down models, which include both Computable General Equilibrium 
models (EPPA, AIM, GEM-E3, IGSM) and Optimal Growth models (DICE, FUND). 
A few studies used bottom-up models (DNE21, MESSAGE, GEMINI, POLES) while 408                                    Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5 
the remainder are based on hybrid models which integrate a bottom-up description of 
sectors responsible for emissions measures with a top-down description of the econo-
my (WITCH, MERGE, MINICAM, IMAGE).  
The different nature of the models can explain part of the differences found in 
permit prices. According to Russ et al. (2006), the general equilibrium models tend to 
produce lower permit prices, since, unlike energy models, they allow for adjustments 
in the whole economy. Optimization models with perfect foresight yield smoother 
trajectories without steep increases for permit prices as compared to models that op-
erate with “myopic anticipation” of future events and decisions. 
It is a matter not only of the type of model, but also of different assumptions 
for the baseline scenario – different economic and population growth and technolog-
ical developments – and for the stabilization scenario – limitations of the mitigation 
portfolio with respect to CCS, forest sinks, nuclear and renewable – and the asso-
ciated uncertainty. 
Many of the studies considered explore the carbon price for both CO2-only 
stabilization targets – 450 and 550 parts per million (ppm) – and for all GHGs. The sta-
bilization scenario at 450 ppm of CO2 in the atmosphere yields higher carbon prices 
than less ambitious stabilization scenarios such as those aiming at 550 ppm. Given 
that the present CO2 concentration level is about 385 ppm, it is easy to understand 
that a high carbon price is necessary to induce investments and technological change 
sufficient to keep concentrations below 450 ppm.  
 
REFERENCES 
Babiker M, Gurgel A, Paltsev S, Reilly J (2008): A Forward Looking Version of the MIT Emissions 
Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) Model. MIT Global Change Joint Program, Report 161, 
May 2008. 
Benz E, Trück S (2006): Modeling the price dynamics of CO2 emission allowances. University of 
Bonn, Working Paper. 
Bernard A, Haurie A, Moresino F, Vielle M, Viguier L (2005): A Coupled Equilibrium Model of 
International Climate Policy. ECOMOD, Istanbul, June 28. 
Blanford GJ, Richels RG, Rutherford TF (2009): Impact of Revised CO2 Growth Projections for 
China on Global Stabilization Goals. Forthcoming in: Implementing Architectures for Agreement: 
Addressing Global Climate Change. In: Stavins R, Aldy J (Eds.): The Post-Kyoto World. Cambridge 
University Press.  
Bole T (2009): Balancing the Carbon Market: Overview of Carbon Price Estimates. Netherlands 
Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Report no. 500102029, July. 
Bosetti V, Carraro C, Massetti E (2008a): Banking Permits: Economic Efficiency and Distributional 
Effects. CEPR Discussion Paper, no. 6652 and FEEM Nota di Lavoro, no. 01/2008, Jan 2008. 
Bosetti V, Carraro C, Tavoni M (2008b): Delayed Participation of Developing Countries to Climate 
Agreements: Should Action in the EU and US be Postponed? Feem Working Paper, no. 70.08, Sept 
2008.  
Bosetti V, Carraro C, Duval R, Sgobbi A, Tavoni M (2009): The Role of R&D and Technology 
Diffusion in Climate Change Mitigation: New Perspectives using the WITCH Model. OECD 
Working Paper, no. 664, February.  
Daiwa (2009): Utilities Carbon outlook – recovery from oversold position or dead cat bounce? 
Equity Research Dept Ashley Thomas. Finance a úvěr-Czech Journal of Economics and Finance, 59, 2009, no. 5                                             409 
Den Elzen MGJ, Hohne N, Vliet J van, Ellermann C (2009): Exploring Comparable Post-2012 
Reduction Efforts for Annex I Countries. MNP Report, no. 500102019, February. 
Deutsche Bank (2008): Carbon emissions. Emissions in remission? Looking at – and through – an 
EU recession. October. 
Ecosystem Marketplace & New Carbon Finance (2008): State of Voluntary Carbon markets 2008. 
Fortis (2008): The Global Carbon Market. CDM/JI and the interaction with the EU-ETS. January. 
Idea Carbon (2008): What a recession means for the carbon market in Europe. October. 
IPCC Fourth Assessment Report Working Group III (2007): Mitigation of Climate Change. Issues 
related to mitigation in the long-term context. Chapter 3. 
Jacoby HD, Babiker MH, Paltsev S, Reilly JM (2008): Sharing the Burden of GHG Reductions. 
Joint Program Report Series, Report 167. 
JP Morgan (2008): European Utilities. All you ever wanted to know about carbon trading 6.1. 
November. 
Neuhoff K (2008): Tackling Carbon – How to price carbon for climate policy. 
http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk  
New Carbon Finance (2008): Fundamentals point to higher carbon prices. May. 
Newell RG, Hall DS (2008): U.S. climate mitigation in the context of global stabilization. 
http://www.rff.org/rff/Publications/upload/31806_1.pdf 
Nordhaus William D (2008): A Question of Balance: Weighing the Options on Global Warming 
Policies. Yale University Press. 
Paltsev S, Reilly JM, Jacoby HD, Morris JF (2009): The Cost of Climate Policy in the United States. 
Joint Program Report Series, Report 173, April. 
Parsons JE, Ellerman AD, Feilhauer S (2009): Designing a U.S. Market for CO2 MIT. Joint 
Program Report Series, Report 171, February. 
Point Carbon (2008): Carbon Market Monitor. EUA-sCER spread. November. 
Point Carbon (2009): Carbon Market Monitor. 2008: year in review. January. 
Reinaud J (2007): CO2 allowance and electricity price interaction impact on industry’s electricity 
purchasing strategies in Europe. IEA Information paper. 
Russ P, Criqui P (2006): Post-Kyoto CO2 emission reduction: the soft landing scenario analysed 
with POLES and other world models. Département Energie et Politiques de l'Environnement (EPE). 
Societe Generale (2008): The European CO2 market. Phase III price forecasts: EUA at 80/t in 2020. 
October. 
Tol RSJ (2009): The Feasibility of Low Concentration Targets: An Application of FUND. ESRI 
Working Paper, no. 285, March. 
Uhrig-Hombur Marliese M, Wagner W (2006): Market Dynamics and Derivative Instrument in 
the EU Emissions Trading Scheme – An Early Market Perspective. Energy & Environment, 19(5): 
635–655.  
US CCSP (U.S. Climate Change Science Program) (2006): Scenarios of Greenhouse Gas Emissions 
and Atmospheric Concentrations. Report by the U.S. Climate Change Science Program and 
approved by the Climate Change Science Program Product Development Advisory Committee. 
(Eds.): Clarke L, Edmonds J, Jacoby J, Pitcher H, Reilly J, Richels R.  